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The concept of biopolitics is a fluid and multi-layered one, whose signification depends in 
each case on the definition and articulation of two much contested notions: ‘politics’ and ‘life.’ 
In a recent study which deals with the history of this concept,1 Thomas Lemke distinguishes 
between two classical ways of understanding it: either biological life is considered as the very 
basis of politics (the ‘naturalistic’ conception: organicism or racism) or it is understood as the 
object of political interventions (biopolitics as a specific ‘domain’ of politics).  Despite their 
strict opposition, these two perspectives share a common ground: in both conceptions, ‘life’ 
and ‘politics’ are seen as autonomous spheres whose connection does not transform the nature 
of the relata.  For Lemke, that is precisely what the Foucaldian genealogy of biopolitics puts 
into question by revealing the strict interdependency of these two ‘domains.’  On the one 
hand, ‘life’ is defined, framed, modified by politics, i.e. by power techniques and their rationa-
lization within the human sciences.  On the other, the entrance on the stage of human beings 
as a biological species in the middle of the 18th century shaped and transformed the meaning 
of the political itself.   
Maria Muhle’s Eine Genealogie der Biopolitik. Zum Begriff des Lebens bei Foucault und Can-
guilhem is an original contribution to the question of the relationship between ‘life’ and ‘poli-
tics’ in Foucault, whose rather inconsistent use of the notion of biopolitics, from Il faut défendre 
la société to La naissance de la biopolitique, makes necessary a philosophical clarification. 
The book emphasizes the potential of the Foucaldian concept in contrast to its quasi-
vitalistic (Hardt/Negri) or pessimistic (Agamben) reception.  Muhle criticizes Hardt and Negri 
because of their naive opposition between a repressive, transcendent-sovereign ‘biopower’ 
and an emancipatory, immanent-collective ‘biopolitics.’  Like Deleuze in his Foucault, Hardt 
and Negri assign to life in Multitude an unruly and resistant force in itself, which according to 
Muhle, perpetuates the phantasm of the existence of a ‘pure,’ innocent, revolutionary power. 
(21-22)  The author also rejects Agamben’s pessimistic thesis in Homo Sacer, which states that 
the production of a biopolitical substance, ‘bare life’ is the constitutive and repressed origin of 
Western sovereign power, as much in its totalitarian as in its democratic forms. (38-55)  
Whereas Agamben attempts to outline a genesis or an archaeology of the foundations of Western 
                                                 
1 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitik zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 2007).  English translation to come: Biopolitics: 
An Advanced Introduction (New York: NYU Press, 2011). 
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power that leads to the discovery of a static, quasi-ontological substance, ‘bare life’, the Fou-
caldian genealogy understands ‘life’ as a secondary, determinable concept: a simple historical 
correlate of concrete power and knowledge structure. (55-60)  Concentration camps and Natio-
nal Socialism do not reveal the ‘true face’ of political modernity.  Instead, they are the specific 
product of the crossing of racist theories and of the absolute militarization of society.  This 
paradoxical combination of sovereign power and bio-power in state-led racism should not be 
considered as structurally necessary, but as historically contingent. 
 The rest of the book attempts to flesh out this claim, and to this end reconstructs 
three historical models of the relationship between power and life, although only in bio-
power does life becomes a political category.  Muhle distinguishes between the sovereign, 
the disciplinary, and the biopolitical forms of power.  These three models not only relate to 
three different concepts of life, but also to three modes of functioning.  The central claim is 
that in biopolitics life is not just the target, power’s field of intervention (biopolitics in a 
restricted sense), but also describes the way the power governs populations (biopolitics in 
an expanded sense).  Biopower is a ‘living power,’ it imitates the logic of the living.  The 
originality of Muhle’s work consists in describing this logic with Georges Canguilhem’s 
concept of ‘living normativity’ (normativité du vivant) which acts as a metaphorical figure 
to think the specificity of biopolitics. 
 First, Muhle examines the difference between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ power which 
culminates, in La volonté de savoir, in the distinction between the negative sovereign power 
‘to make die and let live’ and the positive biopower ‘to make live and let die.’  The right to 
life and death of the sovereign power is in the modern theory of natural right a relatively 
limited one: it is only legitimated by the defence of sovereignty and territory.  But this 
legal model of power has no ‘active’ access to life, it is only a power to kill, to appropriate, 
to extort riches, resources, goods and labour (droit de prise).  In the passage from the clas-
sical age to the modern age, Foucault locates another kind of interaction between power 
and life, which is based on incitation, control, supervision and an increase of living forces 
– in short,  a more ‘intimate’ mode of life-domination.  In La volonté de savoir, Foucault 
designates the structure of biopower, which becomes visible through the ‘sexual dispositif’ 
in the 19th century, as a combination of discipline (the anatomico-politics of the human 
body) and a biopolitics of population (regulatory control of the species body).  The first 
technology of power organizes the submission and subject-becoming (assujetissement) of 
individuals, i.e. their dressage within institutions like the family or school, in particular 
through the control of sexual behaviour.  The second one does not intervene directly on 
individual bodies, but on populations and their environments, understood as global 
biological phenomena, distinct from the peuple des citoyens, with its own characteristics like 
birth- and death-rate, public health, average life, as well as its own devices of measure-
ment such as statistics and probability calculations. (21-30)  
 Discipline and biopolitics are for Muhle two radically different models of power 
that however are not clearly distinguished in La Volonté de savoir.  This distinction is made 
only in the first lectures of Securité, Territoire, Population: what Foucault designates there as 
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‘security dispositif’ and which is considered as an essential part of liberal governmentality, 
is for Muhle the same as biopolitics (237-281); different words, same concept.  This exten-
sion of the concept of biopolitics is made possible because Muhle understands life not just 
as the target of biopower (the restricted sense), but also as its model of functioning (the 
expanded sense).  Whereas discipline concentrates, focuses and encloses, security (bio-
politics) constantly widens its scope.   Discipline regulates everything and security tends 
to ‘let things happen.’  Law focuses on prohibition, discipline on prescription, and security 
responds at the level of reality in order to regulate phenomena.  Whereas disciplinary 
power subjects human bodies to an external norm and forces them into mechanism-like 
behaviours (normation), biopower tries to ‘govern’ populations starting from their inner 
norms (normalisation). (241-247)  Muhle’s claim is that the condition of possibility of this 
‘living’ model of power and of the constitution of its intervention field, the ‘population’, is 
a biological concept of the living, as it has been developed since 1800.   
 Canguilhem’s history of biology reconstructs this new concept.  According to him, 
the originality of the ‘living fact’ (fait vital) as a biological fact consists in the production of 
specific norms, which have nothing to do with the laws of natural sciences.  Indeed, the 
universality and invariance of physical laws can for example not comprehend phenome-
nona such as anomalies, deviances, and the possibility of therapy. (89-96)  However, it 
does not mean that modern biology returns to an aristotelian tradition in which a living 
telos is pre-inscribed in every organism.  The new discipline, blooming around 1800, in fact 
breaks with both reductive conceptions of life: that of organism as fully determined by 
external, physical conditions or as fully determined by an internal ‘programme.’  The 
norms of a biological organism are in fact historical and variable.  They cannot be set a 
priori because they are, as the French physiologist Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) claimed, the 
product of a perpetual conflict between the organism and its environment, between the 
organism and death, diseases, i.e. ‘negatives values.’  
The specific contribution of Canguilhem to the epistemology of modern biology 
consists in understanding the biological ‘vital norm,’ not only as an optimal mode of 
organic self-regulation, but also as a normative force.  The normal state of an organism in 
its relation to its environment, its self-conservation, is to be considered as the product of 
this inner normativity: organisms do not simply adapt to their environment but transform 
and produce it too. (159)  Biological life does not simply have norms of its own, it creates 
them too.  This explains the possibility that life can ‘fail.’  Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that errors and anomalies are in themselves ‘negative values’, i.e. pathological.  In the 
pathological state, the ‘living normativity’ of an organism is in fact reduced to one of its 
poles, that of self-conservation.  A ‘normal norm’ is the one which expresses stability, 
fertility, and a variability of life in an equivalent or superior degree compared to a pre-
viously existing norm.  The anomaly may, therefore, become a disease but it is not in itself 
disease.  Anomalies and mutations prove the diversity of life, its multiple possibilities.  In 
some cases, they can grow and ‘normalize’ if they optimize the functioning of the orga-
nism. 
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 The dynamic polarity of living normativity, between bare self-conservation and self-
surpassing, between normality and normativity, between the existing norm and its pro-
ductive deviance, is central in Muhle’s conception of biopolitics.   Canguilhem himself, in 
the Nouvelles Réflexions sur le normal et le pathologique, strictly distinguished between vital 
and social norms.  In his later work, he revisited his previous vitalism and refused to 
equate the functioning of societies to that of biological organisms inasmuch as societies do 
not have any intrinsic finality, any immanent dispositif.  Autopoeisis, in the human world, 
has to be consciously and reflexively generated: societies are machines which work like 
organisms, but they are not organisms.  Similarly, the Foucaldian concept of biopolitics 
functions on the paradoxical model of an ‘inner externality’ (innere Äußerlichkeit) or of a 
‘natural artificiality’ (natürliche Künstlichkeit).  In order to govern life, biopolitics imitates 
the logic of the living without being a ‘politics of life.’  
 In the conclusion, Muhle underlines two aspects of this living logic. (261-263)  First, 
the goal of biopolitics is to guarantee the security of a population as a whole.  For this rea-
son, it can tolerate ‘deviances’ and ‘mutations’ of the existing norms and make them pro-
ductive, as long they do not threaten the global order.  Secondly, biopolitical techniques 
tend to create a setting in which the population can optimally regulate itself.  Biopower, 
contrary to discipline, does not intervene directly on the organisms, but on its environ-
ment (milieu).  It controls and organizes the natural-social conditions of development of a 
population: the health coverage system, the pension system, and the politics of habitat.   
 Against a new conservative tendency in Foucauldian studies of governmentality, 
Muhle does not take biopower or liberal governmentality to be a ‘good’ form of power, or 
as a positive ‘politics of life,’ but as a subtle and very efficient mechanism of domination.  
However, her critical impetus fades away rather quickly in her use of Canguilhem’s 
vitalist conceptuality.  Biological metaphors, in spite of the precautions of the author (‘for-
mal analogy,’ ‘as if’ etc.), tend to biologize social processes and thus to reinforce the logic of 
power that the author criticizes.  This mode of conceptuality seems indeed to offer no pos-
sibility of real resistance against a living and dynamic power which can absorb and use 
every deviant behaviour to its own advantage.  These life metaphorics may provide a key 
for grasping the subtlety and specificity of this new form of power but they do not 
constitute a conceptual instrument with which to analyze it. 
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